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The present paper examines the conditions under which the regulator can complement
the provision of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities by private ﬁrms in an
oligopolistic market. Our main ﬁnding is that if there is no credible information disclosure
about SR characteristics of the ﬁrms’ products to consumers, no ﬁrm will have incentives
to undertake CSR eﬀort in equilibrium. However, if the necessary information about the
CSR aspects of each ﬁrm’s product, otherwise unobservable, is made available to consumers
through certiﬁcation provided either by a proﬁt-maximizing certiﬁer or by the regulator,
then both ﬁrms will have incentives to engage in CSR activities. Hence in equilibrium,
consumers’ surplus, ﬁrms proﬁts and total welfare increase comparing to the benchmark
case without CSR activities.
JEL Classiﬁcation: M14, L13, L5.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Oligopoly, Vertical Diﬀerentiation, Certiﬁca-
tion.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The large publicity on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR hereafter) over the last few years
has led many companies to account for the social consequences of their activities. As a result,
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1CSR has emerged as a prime issue among ﬁrms, seeking ways to beneﬁts o c i e t ya n da tt h e
same time, receive a beneﬁt from this new challenge.1 Following the terminology of Porter &
Kramer (2006), potential ﬁrms’ beneﬁts from engaging in CSR actions may be moral obligation,
sustainability, “license to operate” and reputation.2 For these beneﬁts to be eﬀective, ﬁrms
have to convince potential consumers about their social orientation.
However, CSR eﬀort by ﬁrms may involve cost increasing actions within their value chain,
which are diﬃcult - if not impossible - to be observed by a large scope of consumers, even
after consumption. For instance, the ﬁrm may operate with respect to the interests of its
stakeholders such as its employees (investing in workplace safety), suppliers (by supporting
local suppliers rather than cheaper alternative sources in order to support the local economy),
and the environment (by reducing emissions of pollutants).3 Therefore, the SR attribute of a
product can be characterized as a credence good. It becomes obvious that, in the absence of a
credible information disclosure system, ﬁrms may fail to persuade socially conscious consumers
about their true commitment to social values, hence they will have no incentives to undertake
any costly CSR activity.
Given this evidence, the following question arises: "Which are the policy instruments that
a regulator can employ in order to promote ﬁrms’ engagement in CSR activities, and what
are their eﬀects on market outcomes and social welfare?". The present paper addresses and
formalizes this question in an oligopolistic market for a ﬁnal good, where consumers diﬀer with
respect to their valuation towards CSR activities.
The basic idea behind our model is that ﬁrms strategically engage in CSR activities in
order to create a "socially friendly image" for their product. We consider that consumers are
homogeneous regarding the physical characteristics of the goods, but heterogeneous towards
the valuation of the CSR aspects of each product. More socially conscious consumers have a
higher valuation for the product of the ﬁrm that engages in CSR activities, hence, they are
willing to pay a higher price for the "socially friendly" good.4
1More than half of the top 100 corporations that are based in the 16 more industrialized countries published
a CSR report in the year 2005 (Becchetti et al., 2006).
2For instance, Baron (2001, 2003), Bagnoli and Watts (2003), Manasakis et. al (2006) and Garcia-Gallego
and Georgantzis (2008) under the scope of strategic CSR, formalize situations where ﬁrms create a socially
friendly image in order to obtain a competitive advantage in the market in which they operate.
3See for example Mayer (1999) and Bris & Brisley (2006).
4Becchetti et al. (2005) quote the "2003 Corporate Social Responsibility Survey". The main ﬁnding of this
survey is that the amount of consumers that are socially concerned about their purchasing choices was 62% in
2001 in Europe.
2Since CSR is deﬁned as: “ﬁrms’ commitment to social and ecological considerations, beyond
the law requirements” there cannot be any “command and control” measures, such as compul-
sory CSR standards, in order to impose socially conscious behavior by ﬁrms. We thus consider
certiﬁcation as a policy instrument, i.e. the regulator sets certain social and environmental
criteria that should be respected during the ﬁrm’s operational activities and then provides a
certiﬁcation to any ﬁrm that fulﬁlls those criteria.5 Following Bottega & De Freitas (2006) we
consider that certiﬁcation from, either a proﬁt-maximizing private organization or the regula-
tor, is an eﬀective system of information disclosure that allows consumers to distinguish the
social characteristics of the products they purchase.6
We investigate two possible scenarios. The ﬁr s to n ei st h e" C e r t i ﬁcation by a private orga-
nization", which assumes that a voluntary certiﬁcate, provided by a private proﬁt maximizing
organization, is an appropriate system of information disclosure that allows consumers to dis-
tinguish the social characteristics of the products they purchase, without the need for a policy
intervention. We ﬁnd that in this case, both ﬁrms’ endogenous choice will be to engage in
CSR, seeking for a competitive advantage at the market competition stage via an increase of
consumers’ willingness to pay for their ﬁnal product. The above interaction between compet-
ing ﬁrms, increases the consumers’ surplus and total welfare comparing to the benchmark case
without CSR activities.
The second scenario refers to the case in which the regulator intervenes in order to solve
the ensuing “market of lemons” problem, by proposing a certain standard of CSR eﬀort to
the ﬁrms, and providing a certiﬁcation to the ﬁrms that comply with the standard voluntary.
Similar to the previus scenario, this certiﬁcation endows consumers with credible information
5For example, the certiﬁcation SA8000 (2006) is specialized in the workers’ human rights in developing
countries and it is developed and overseen by the Social Accountability International (SAI) (http://www.sa-
intl.org/. Date last visited: May 24, 2008).
Additionally, an example of a public certiﬁer is ISO 26000 which will certify SR activities by ﬁrms starting
from 2008. (http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/home.html. Date
last visited: May 24, 2008).
According to Bottega & De Freitas (2006), an example of for proﬁt organizations that provides certiﬁcation
is Ecocert (see http://www.ecocert.com. Date last visited May 24, 2008). Another example is the Scientiﬁc
Certiﬁcation Systems (SCS),which certiﬁes environmental consciousness in product manufacturing and natural
resource extraction.
6This assumption is in line with recent empirical evidence, according to which, EU citizens trust better a
certiﬁcation labeled on the product, comparing with other forms of information about the social characteristics
of the products they purchase (see Fliess et al., 2007). It is assumed here, that the certiﬁer spends an amount
from the certiﬁcation fees that collects on informative advertising, in order to inform consumers about the CSR
characteristics of the certiﬁcation that provides.
3about the CSR aspects of each ﬁrm’s product, otherwise unobservable. Our main ﬁnding is
that the regulator will set a standard of positive CSR eﬀort up to a level, at which both ﬁrms
will have incentives to comply. This standard will be higher than the one set by the private
certiﬁer. Hence, in equilibrium, consumers surplus and total welfare increase comparing with
the benchmark case without CSR activities and the "certiﬁcation by a private organization"
conﬁguration.
Unlike the present paper, the vast majority of the literature on quality certiﬁcation is based
on the seminal paper of Gabszewich and Thise (1979) and concentrates on oligopolistic models
in which ﬁrms’ products diﬀer only in their vertical quality characteristics, which are observ-
able by consumers.7 Moreover, in the aforementioned literature, the cost to increase quality is
assumed to be zero, or ﬁxed. Our duopolistic market is based on Häckner (2000) along with
Garella and Petrakis (2008), therefore assumes a utility function that combines horizontal and
vertical diﬀerentiation aspects of the products of the ﬁrms. The vertical diﬀerentiation repre-
sents the CSR aspects of the production process that are perceived as a quality improvement
of the ﬁnal product by socially conscious consumers. The present paper contributes to this
branch of the literature assuming that, since CSR is considered as a credence good, there is no
ex ante mechanism that can credibly inform consumers about the CSR characteristics of each
product. Hence, in the absence of such an information disclosure mechanism, ﬁr m sw i l lf a i lt o
persuade consumers about their true commitment to social values, thus, a “market of lemons”
problem arises.8 Additionaly we assume that engaging in CSR increases variable costs, also.
This paper also built on a recent branch of the certiﬁcation literature, that examines the ef-
fects of alternative certiﬁcation regimes, considering that the true quality of the ﬁnal products
is diﬃcult to be observed by consumers. Bottega and De Freitas (2006) examine the wel-
fare implications of the coexistence of public and private environmental quality certiﬁcation
schemes, in a monopolistic context. Our work is closer to the work of Bonroy and Constantatos
(2008), in the sense that an oligopolistic market for ﬁnal products is assumed, in which the
strategic interactions between the competing ﬁrms are investigated. They examine the certiﬁ-
cation of credence goods’ quality, in a Bertrand competition context, focusing on the diﬀerence
7See for instance Daughety and Reinganum, (2005), Garella and Fluet, (2002).
8More speciﬁcally, once consumers have been convinced that one ﬁrm has undertaken a positive CSR eﬀort
they increase their willingness to pay for the ﬁrm’s good. The ﬁr mh a sn oi n c e n t i v e st os p e n do nC S Ra c t i v i t i e s ,
as these are costly for the ﬁrm. Consumers realize the ﬁrm’s incentives and thus rationally believe that there
will be zero CSR activity. The ﬁrm, in turn, spends zero on CSR activities, in equilibrium.
4between mandatory and voluntary certiﬁcation, where labelling does not always reveal perfect
information. Conversely, in our work we examine ﬁrms’ incentives for engaging in CSR (hence
providing a credence attribute of a higher quality to their ﬁnal product), focusing on diﬀerent
sources of certiﬁcation (public or private) and assuming that certiﬁcation is always voluntary
and reveals perfect information.
Our work also contributes to the existing literature on "strategic CSR", a term that was
introduced by Baron (2001) and refers to the case where ﬁr m sa r ea s s u m e dt ob es o c i a l l yr e -
sponsible because they anticipate a beneﬁt from such a behavior. Baron (2001, 2003) examines
CSR under the prism of a strategic choice between public and private politics. His main ﬁnding
is that private politics and CSR aﬀect the strategic position of a ﬁrm in an industry under
the existence of activist consumers, who can boycott ﬁrms with non-socially friendly behavior.
In the same vein, Calveras et al. (2006), assuming a perfectly competitive supply of inputs,
compare the eﬀects of formal regulation to ﬁrms’ incentives to provide socially friendly goods
as a response to increased activismfrom the consumers. They argue that the substitution of
the formal regulation with ﬁrms CSR actions may cause ineﬃciency, in which non activist
consumers free-ride the willingness to pay of activist consumers, because of a lower formal reg-
ulation. Nevertheless, the above literature focuses on the diﬀerence between the provision of
CSR by private ﬁrms and by the regulator. The main diﬀerence between the present work and
the above literature is that the our paper examines the conditions under which the regulator
can complement the provision of CSR by private ﬁrms, via the provision of certiﬁcation to the
ﬁrms that engage in CSR.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3 the diﬀerent scenarios are solved and a detailed equilibrium analysis is conducted, whereas
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We examine a market, where in the production side there are two ﬁrms, denoted by i,j =1 ,2,
i 6= j.E a c hﬁrm produces one brand of a diﬀerentiated good. On the demand side, there is a
unit mass of consumers composed by individuals who have homogeneus preferences regarding
the physical characteristics of the goods. They are, however, heterogeneous regarding their
valuation of the CSR activities that are undertaken by the ﬁrm that produces the good. In
5particular, following Häckner (2000), the utility function of the θ-type consumer is given by:
U =( a + θsi)xi(θ)+( a + θsj)xj(θ) − [x2
i(θ)+x2
j(θ)+2 γxi(θ)xj(θ)]/2+m(θ) (1)
where xi(θ), i =1 ,2, represents the quantity of good i bought by the consumer of type θ,
and m(θ) is the respective quantity of the “composite good”. The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] is a
measure of the degree of substitutability among goods, with γ =0corresponding to the case
of independent goods and γ =1to that of homogeneous goods. Further, si ≥ 0 represents the
CSR eﬀort that ﬁrm i undertakes, which, in turn, increases the θ-type consumer’s valuation for
its good by θsi.I no t h e rw o r d s ,θ represents the increase of the θ-type consumer’s willingness
to pay for the ﬁrm i’s good per unit of CSR eﬀort undertaken by ﬁrm i. Thus, the more
socially conscious a consumer is, the higher is its θ, while a consumer who does not value the
ﬁrms’ CSR activities at all is of type θ =0 .W ea s s u m et h a tθ is distributed uniformly where
θ ∈ [0,1].T h u s ,¯ θ =1 /2 represents the average type of consumer in the population.
Maximization of utility (1) with respect to xi(θ) and xj(θ) gives the (inverse) demand
functions for the θ-type consumer:
pi = a + θsi − xi(θ) − γxj(θ),i =1 ,2 (2)
where pi and pj are the ﬁrms’ unit prices, while the price of the composite good has been
normalized to unity. By inverting (2) we obtain the θ-type consumer’s demand for good i:
xi(θ)=
a(1 − γ)+θ(si − γsj) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (3)








a(1 − γ)+¯ θ(si − γsj) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (4)
Finally, by inverting (4), we obtain the ﬁrm i’s (inverse) aggregate demand function:
pi(qi,q j)=a + ¯ θsi − qi − γqj,i =1 ,2,i6= j (5)
6Observe that the aggregate demand function corresponds to the demand function of an average
type consumer, ¯ θ.
We assume that both ﬁrms are endowed with identical constant returns to scale production
technologies. Firm i’s total cost function is given by Ci(qi,s i)=c(1+s2
i)qi. This implies that,
for a given CSR eﬀort si,t h eﬁrm i’s marginal (and average) production cost is constant
and equal to c(1 + s2
i). Yet, a higher CSR eﬀort increases, at an increasing rate, ﬁrm i’s
unit production costs. This can be justiﬁed on the grounds that an individual ﬁrm’s level of
CSR activities, such as improving working conditions for employees, buying more expensive
inputs from local suppliers, ﬁnancing recycling and other SR campaigns or introducing “green”
technologies, has an increasingly negative impact on the ﬁrm’s unit production costs.
Firm i’s proﬁts can then be expressed as:
Πi =( a + ¯ θsi − qi − γqj)qi − c(1 + s2
i)qi (6)
Therefore, CSR activities by ﬁrm i lead to a higher consumers’ valuation for its product
and thus to a higher aggregate demand for the ﬁrm but, at the same time, they increase ﬁrm
i’s unit and total production costs. Note however that the CSR eﬀort of the ﬁrms may not be
observable by the consumers even after consumption. Thus, the SR quality of a product can be
categorized as a credence good and a “lemons’ problem” arises in our setup. Once consumers
have been convinced that ﬁrm i has undertaken a CSR eﬀort si, and have thus increased their
willingness to pay for the ﬁrm’s good, the ﬁrm has no incentives to spend on CSR activities,
as these are costly for the ﬁrm. Consumers realize the ﬁrm’s intentions and thus rationally
believe that there will be zero CSR activity. The ﬁrm, in turn, spends zero on CSR activities
in equilibrium.
T or e s o l v et h ee n s u i n gl e m o n sp r o b l e m ,w ee v o k et h el i t e r a t u r eo nc e r t i ﬁcation. More
speciﬁcally, we consider two alternative scenarios: The ﬁrst one refers to the case in which a
proﬁt-maximizing organization provides ﬁrms with a credible certiﬁcate about their SR activ-
ities, while the second one considers the case in which the regulator intervenes, by providing
the certiﬁcation himself with respect to total welfare.
73 Equilibrium Analysis.
3.1 The Benchmark case without CSR activities.
Before proceeding to the examination of the alternative certiﬁcation scenarios, we brieﬂyd i s -
cuss the benchmark case where no owner engages in CSR and thus s1 = s2 =0 .9 In this sce-
nario, the market outcomes coincide with the standard Cournot game with diﬀerentiated goods,
where each owner chooses his ﬁrm’s output to maximize his proﬁts, Πi =( a−qi −γqj)qi−cqi.
From the ﬁrst order condition, the reaction function of owner i is,
qi = RC
i (qj)=
a − γqj − c
2
(7)









(2 + γ)2 (8)
Finally, since all consumers have identical preferences over the physical characteristics of
the two goods and there is a unit mass of them in the population, it turns out that each
consumer buys a quantity xC = qC of each good. Using (1) and (8), it can be checked that the
consumers surplus and total welfare are given by CSC =( qC)2(1+γ) and TWC =( qC)2(3+γ)
respectively.
3.2 Certiﬁcation by a private organization.
In this section we begin our analysis by assuming that the only credible information disclosure
system from ﬁrms to consumers regarding the CSR attribute of the products can only be
provided through a certiﬁcation by a private, proﬁt maximizing organization.10 Following
Bottega and De Freitas (2006) along with Hardling and Alexander (2003), we assume that the
private certiﬁer has all the bargaining power, hence, he is in position to extract all the extra
proﬁts from the CSR activities of the ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm’s owner can set the CSR eﬀort proposed
9This conﬁguration also reﬂects the case where a ﬁrm that engages in CSR does not have any credible way
to persuade consumers about its social orientation. In this case, the results coincide with the ones obtained in
this subsection.
10Following the terminology of Bonroy and Constantatos (2008), we assume that this certiﬁcation is perfect.
Hence, if consumers see the CSR certiﬁcation of a product, they are aware that the ﬁrm producing it is socially
responsible.
8by the private certiﬁer or not engage in CSR activities at all. Each owner may make lower
CSR eﬀort than the proposed standard and claim not to have done so. Therefore, the private
certiﬁer has to monitor and certify CSR eﬀo r tm a d eb yﬁrms, assuming that, the probability
the certiﬁer tracing an owner that reveals untruthful information is almost unity. The cost of
monitoring is paid by each ﬁrm that wishes to be certiﬁed. More speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm will be
willing to get the certiﬁcation from the private certiﬁer and engage in CSR only if the proﬁts
of engaging in CSR are higher, or equal than if ﬁrm acts in the opposite manner. Hence, the
proﬁts of the private certiﬁer will be equal to a fee given by:
F = Πpc
gross − πC (9)
where Π
pc
gross stands for the gross ﬁrm’s proﬁts from engaging in CSR, before the payment of
the fee, and πC represents ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the case no ﬁrm engages in CSR. The fee cannot be
higher than Π
pc
gross −πC, because then the ﬁrm will not have incentives to engage in CSR and
to eventually seek for certiﬁcation. Thus, the objective of the private certiﬁer coincides with
the ﬁrms extra proﬁts from CSR eﬀort.11
We consider a three stage game. At the ﬁrst stage, the private certiﬁer sets the CSR eﬀort
standard and the fee for certiﬁcation in order to maximize his proﬁts. At the second stage,
both ﬁrms’ owners decide whether or not they will engage in CSR. If they do so, they have
to comply with the standard and pay the fee in order to be certiﬁed. At the last stage, ﬁrms
compete in the market a lá Cournot. We solve the game backwards.
At the last stage of the game, owner i sets qi to maximize his ﬁrm’s proﬁts (6), taking as
given the output qj of his rival, along with the CSR eﬀorts, (si,s j), chosen at the previous
stages.




a − c − γqj
2
+






i (qj) with the benchmark case with no CSR activities RC
i (qj), in which only
the ﬁrst term of the RHS of (10) appears, we observe that CSR eﬀort has two opposing eﬀects
on owner i’s output decision. On the one hand, CSR eﬀort si augments the demand for the
11We assume that the private certiﬁer spends a part of F on monitoring and informative advertising in order
to provide information about the SR characteristics of the product to consumers.
9ﬁrm i’s good and thus tends to increase equilibrium output. However, it increases ﬁrm i’s
unit costs as well, tending to decrease equilibrium output. If 0 <s i < ¯ θ/c the ﬁrst eﬀect is
dominant and the CSR eﬀort undertaken by ﬁrm i shifts its reaction function outwards.12 If
si > ¯ θ/c, the opposite holds.




a(2 − γ)+¯ θ(2si − γsj) − c[2(1 + s2




Observe that ﬁrm i’s equilibrium output increases with si, while it decreases with sj.13 The
higher the ﬁrm i’s CSR eﬀort si is, the higher the ﬁrm i’s output will be. This occurs because
the owner then obtains higher proﬁts per unit of output produced by ﬁrm i. On the other
hand, when the rival owner sets a higher output for ﬁrm j, ﬁrm i’s owner optimally reacts by
reducing his ﬁrm’s output (due to the strategic substitutability of the decision variables). A
similar reasoning applies when ﬁrm j’s CSR eﬀort becomes higher, in which case its owner has
incentives to increase ﬁrm j’s output, since he earns higher proﬁts per unit of output produced.
At the second stage, both ﬁrms decide whether they will engage in CSR or not, given the
level of CSR set by the certiﬁer. By assumption, ﬁrms will engage in CSR only if the net proﬁts
are equal or higher to the ones obtained under the benchmark regime without CSR activities.
That is only if: Π
pc
net ≥ πC.
At the ﬁrst stage, the private certiﬁer chooses CSR eﬀort si to maximize ﬁrm i’s gross
proﬁts, which from the focs of (6) is given as PR
pc
i (si,s j)=[ q
pc
i (si,s j)]2. The foc of the latter
is equivalent to ∂q
pc









Plugging spc into eq.(11), (4) and (6), for ¯ θ =1 /2, we obtain the equilibrium values for
output, price and gross proﬁts, respectively,
qpc =
1+1 6 c(a − c)
16c(2 + γ)
(13)
12This is in fact the case in equilibrium - see below.
13Provided that si,s j <
¯ θ









1 + 16(a − c)c
16c(2 + γ)
)2 (14)
Hence, with respect to (9), the net proﬁts for the private certiﬁer and ﬁrm i are given by
Πpc
gross − πC = F =
1+3 2 ( a − c)c
128c2(2 + γ)2 ,and Π
pc
net = πC =
(a − c)2
(2 + γ)2 (15)
Clearly, from (12), the CSR eﬀort increases with the social consciousness of the average
consumer type ¯ θ, while it decreases with the degree of ineﬃciency of the CSR “production
technology” (as captured by a higher c). Finally, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms’ owners’ endogenous
choice is to engage in CSR activities when the private certiﬁer sets a positive CSR eﬀort
spc =
¯ θ
2c > 0. The intuition behind this is that the private certiﬁer optimally sets a positive
level of CSR eﬀort spc up to the point that the certiﬁed ﬁrm will maximize its gross proﬁts,
and thus the fees that he collects. Since each ﬁrm obtains proﬁts equal to its previus status
Π
pc
net = πC,f o rspc then the endogenous choise of both ﬁrms is to engage in CSR. Furthermore,
if one ﬁrm does not engage in CSR then the rival ﬁrm obtains a competitive advantage in the
market and it ends up with lower proﬁt levels than its previus status. The following Proposition
summarizes:
Proposition 1: In the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario, assuming that ﬁrms’
certiﬁcation by a private organization is a credible system of information provision to
consumers about the CSR characteristics of the products they purchase, there exists a
level of positive CSR eﬀort, such that both ﬁrms’ owners’ endogenous choice is to engage
in CSR activities.
Let us now consider the societal eﬀects of owners decision to engage in CSR.





net + F (16)
with 2Π
pc
net + F and CS
pc
net being the overall market proﬁts and net consumers’ surplus
respectively.





In equilibrium, due to symmetry, we have s∗
i = s∗
j = spc and p∗
i = p∗
j = ppc. Thus, after
some manipulations, eq.(17) and (3) become:
CS(θ)=( 1+γ)[x∗(θ)]2 (18)
x∗(θ)=
a + θsSR − pSR
1+γ
(19)














Therefore, with respect to eq.(16) and (17) the total welfare is now given by:
TWpc =








1 + 32(a − c)c
128c2(2 + γ)2 (22)
By comparing the equilibrium values of output, proﬁts, consumers surplus, and total
welfare obtained in the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario to the correspondicg




net = πC, CS
pc
net >C S C and
TWSR >TW C always. Hence, the following Proposition holds:14
14However, the above results are valid only under the assumption that the certiﬁcation by a private orga-
nization is a credible mechanism of information provision to consumers about the CSR characteristics of the
products they purchase. If one loosens this assumption, ﬁrms will fail to persuade consumers about their true
commitment to social values, thus a “market of lemons” problem arises. In this case, no ﬁrm will have incentives
to undertake CSR eﬀort in equilibrium, and the equilibrium outcomes will coincide with the ones observed in
the benchmark case without CSR activities.
12Proposition 2: In the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario, equilibrium output,
gross proﬁts, consumers’ surplus and total welfare are always higher comparing with the
ones obtained in the benchmark case without CSR activities.
For proof see Appendix
It is easy to understand the reason behind output levels by considering the arguments
about both ﬁrms’ reaction functions after eq.(10). Since spc < ¯ θ/c, then output will be higher
in the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario. Let us now consider ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
We obtain Π
pc
net = πC, since the private certiﬁer extracts all extra proﬁts by assumption.
Also the total proﬁtability in this market represented by Π
pc
gross is equal or higher than the
benchmark. Regarding consumers’ s u r p l u si ti si n c r e a s i n gi nC S Re ﬀort. Hence, since spc ≥ 0
then consumers surplus in the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario is equal or
higher comparing with the benchmark one. Regarding total welfare, according to proposition
1 it has already been clear that in equilibrium, each ﬁrm’s owner will engage in CSR. This
interaction among competing ﬁrms has a positive eﬀect on total welfare, since it increases
output, gross proﬁts and consumers’ surplus as well. On the other hand, engaging in CSR
increases variable cost of production, which decreases total welfare. It is found that the positive
eﬀect of increased proﬁts and consumers’ surplus on total welfare dominates over the negative
eﬀect of increased costs and thus, TWSR >TW Calways.15
3.3 Certiﬁcation by the regulator.
In this subsection, assuming there is no other appropriate system of information disclosure
endowing consumers with the necessary information about the CSR characteristics of the
products they purchase, we consider that the regulator proposes a certain standard of CSR
eﬀort to the ﬁrms, denoted by sR, and provides a certiﬁcation to the ﬁrms that comply with the
standard.16 We assume that now this kind of certiﬁcation is credible to consumers. Similar
15Anecdotal evidence regarding the CSR practices of some corporationssreveal that in some cases engaging in
CSR, besides variable costs, may also aﬀect the ﬁxed costs of the ﬁrm. Such examples could be the installation
of a ﬁlter in a polluting facility in order to abate externalities caused by its operation, or the deployment of
a production process that decreases labor accidents so as to ensure working safety for employees. Our results
are sensitive to the assumption of CSR aﬀecting the ﬁxed costs of the ﬁrm. More speciﬁcally, if ﬁxed costs are
not signiﬁcantly high, then nothing will change regarding the results. In the opposite case, the results will be
sensitive to the extent that ﬁxed costs may eﬀect the proﬁtability of the ﬁrms that engage in CSR. Thus, the
case where no owner engages in CSR may appear in equilibrium.
16Note that a similar modeling can also be considered for the case in which a non for proﬁt organization, such
a saN G O ,p r o v i d e st h ec e r t i ﬁcation, instead of the regulator with respect to social welfare. In this case, like in
13to the previous subsection, the owner of each ﬁrm can set the CSR eﬀort proposed by the
regulator or not engage in CSR activities at all. The regulator has to monitor and certify CSR
eﬀort made by ﬁrms, assuming that the probability of tracing an owner that reveals untruthful
information is almost unity. The ﬁxed cost of monitoring is denoted by M and it is paid by
each ﬁrm that wishes to be certiﬁed.17 Thus, rhe objective function of each ﬁrm’s owner is
now given by the following expression:
ΠR
i =( a + ¯ θsi − qi − γqj)qi − c(1 + s2
i)qi − M (23)
where M =0 i nt h ec a s ei nw h i c haﬁrm does not engage in CSR, hence, certiﬁcation is
inapplicable.
We consider a three stage game. At the ﬁrst stage, the regulator ﬁxes a standard of CSR
eﬀort sR, with respect to total welfare. At the second stage, given sR,b o t hﬁrms’ owners
decide on whether or not to engage in CSR activities, while at the last stage owners compete
in the market a lá Cournot. We solve the game using backwards induction.
Hence, at the last stage of the game, owner i sets qi to maximize his ﬁrm’s proﬁts, now
given by eq.(23), taking as given the output qj of his rival, along with the CSR eﬀort sR chosen
by the regulator at the ﬁrst stage.






sR(¯ θ − csR)
2+γ
(24)
Plugging eq.(24) into (4) and (23) one obtains ﬁrms i’s price and proﬁts during stage 2,
respectively:
pi(sR)=
a + c(1 + γ)
2+γ
+









sR(¯ θ − csR)
(2 + γ)2
£
2(a − c)+sR(¯ θ − csR)
¤
− M (26)
the "certiﬁcation by the regulator" scenario, the fee will be equal to the monitoring and informative advertizing
expenses.
17M can only be spent by the regulator in order to cover monitoring costs and informative advertizing expences
that will acknowledge the certiﬁcation to consumers.
14At the second stage, both ﬁrms decide on whether to engage in CSR activities or not. Firms
will undertake CSR eﬀort only if their proﬁtability is higher, comparing to the benchmark
case without CSR activities. Hence, by considering eq.(26), ﬁrms will engage in CSR only
if:
sR(¯ θ−csR)












16c2(2+γ)2 ,w h e r esR
pc represents the CSR eﬀort participation constraint of each ﬁrm. Note
that sR




16c2(2+γ)2 . Thus, from the analysis of eq.(10), if
the above condition holds, the increase in ﬁrms’ proﬁts due to higher demand and revenues
from producing CSR related products overcomes the increase in ﬁrms’ costs due to a higher
CSR eﬀort and monitoring expenditures (comparing with the benchmark case without CSR
activities) and therefore, both ﬁrms will have incentives to engage in CSR activities. Otherwise
owners will have no incentives to comply with the CSR standard.18
At the ﬁrst stage, the regulator sets CSR eﬀort so as to maximize total welfare now given
by:
TWR = CSR
net(sR)+2 Πi(sR)+2 M (27)




3(1+γ) represents the net consumers
surplus in the "certiﬁcation the regulator" scenario. By solving the foc and rearranging, we
obtain the socially optimal minimum CSR eﬀort sR∗
.19 Note that if sR∗
≤ sR
pc, then the
regulator will set sR∗




does not give incentives to ﬁrms to get involved in CSR, hence the standard is useless.
Since the regulator’s objective is that both ﬁrms engage in CSR, that will improve welfare he
sets sR such that:
sR =m i n [ sR∗
,s R
pc] (28)
By comparing the CSR eﬀort level set in the "certiﬁcation by the regulator" scenario (sR)
with the one set in the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario (spc)w eﬁnd that
sR >s pc, hence the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 3: In the "certiﬁcation by the regulator" scenario, the CSR eﬀort level standard
18In this case, the prevailing equilibrium coincides with the Benchmark case without CSR.
19Due to space limits, some algebraic formulas are not presented. These are available from the authors upon
request.
15sR =m i n [ sR∗
,s R
pc] chosen by the regulator, is always higher comparing with the one
chosen by the proﬁt maximizing certiﬁer.
For proof see Appendix
The intuition behind this result is that, in the"certiﬁcation by a private organization" sce-
nario the private certiﬁer’s objective is to maximize each ﬁrm’s gross proﬁt s ,s oa st om a x i m i z e
the fees to be collected. However, in the "certiﬁcation by the regulator scenario", the regulator,
besides ﬁrms’ proﬁts, also includes net consumers surplus in his objective function in order to
maximize total welfare. As a result CSR eﬀort standard level set by the regulator is always
higher than the one set by the private certiﬁer.
3.3.1 Comparative Analysis
We cannot obtain an analytical solution regarding which level of CSR eﬀo r tt h a tt h er e g u l a t o r
will ﬁnally set (sR∗
or sR
pc). In order to present some qualitative comparative results we restrict
our attention to the case in which the relative market size (a − c) is suﬃciently high, and the
marginal that is not connected to CSR (c) is not too low in order to avoid corner solutions and
ensure the concavity in the total welfare function.
Remark 1 stands for the comparison of the market outcomes for the three alternative
scenarios:
Remark 1: In the "certiﬁcation by the regulator scenario", equilibrium output is always lower
(higher) comparing with the ones obtained under the certiﬁcation by a private organization
regime (the benchmark case without CSR activities). Net proﬁts are equal or higher and
consumers’ surplus and total welfare are always higher than in any alternative scenario.
For proof see Appendix
The rationale behind output levels is being analyzed in the Appendix. Regarding ﬁrms’
proﬁts. In the "certiﬁcation by the regulator scenario", with respect to the ﬁrms participation
constraint to CSR activities, ﬁrms net proﬁts will be equal or higher to the ones obtained in the
alternative scenarios. The reason behind this that since sR =m i n [ sR∗
,s R
pc] then if sR∗
≤ sR
pc
then the inequality holds, while if sR∗
≥ sR
pc then proﬁts in all scenarios are equal. However, the
results regarding the gross proﬁts since sR ≥ spc,t h et o t a lp r o ﬁts obtained in the "certiﬁcation
16by the regulator" scenario will be lower than the gross proﬁts in the "certiﬁcation by a private
organization" scenario, due to higher CSR expenses and less output. This is due to the fact that
in this case ﬁrms put more CSR eﬀort, than they would optimally choose. Now, let us focus
on consumers’ surplus. This is increasing in CSR eﬀort. Hence, with respect to proposition 3,
since sR ≥ spc, then consumers surplus in the certiﬁcation by the regulator scenario is equal
or higher comparing with the alternative ones. Finally, let us consider total welfare. There are
two opposite eﬀects on total welfare. First, the increase in the consumers surplus due to higher
CSR eﬀort in the "certiﬁcation by the regulator" increases welfare. Second, as analyzed above,
the total proﬁts obtained in the "certiﬁcation by the regulator" scenario will be lower than the
gross proﬁts in the "certiﬁcation by a private organization" scenario. Results in equilibrium
reveal that the positive increase on consumers’ surplus dominates over any negative eﬀect,
hence total welfare is higher under the "certiﬁcation by the regulator scenario", comparing
with any alternative conﬁguration.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The present paper examines the conditions under which the regulator can complement the
provision of CSR by private ﬁrms. We consider two alternative scenarios: The ﬁrst, refers
to the case in which a private, proﬁt-maximizing organization provides ﬁrms with a credible
certiﬁcate about their SR activities. The second, considers the case in which the regulator
intervenes, by providing the certiﬁcation himself with respect to total welfare.
Our main ﬁnding is that if there is no credible information disclosure about SR charac-
teristics of the ﬁrms’ products to consumers, no ﬁrm will have incentives to undertake CSR
eﬀort in equilibrium. However, if the necessary information about the CSR aspects of each
ﬁrm’s product, otherwise unobservable, is revealed to consumers through certiﬁcation, then
the opposite holds. More speciﬁcally, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms’ endogenous choice is to en-
gage in CSR activities, hence consumers’ surplus and total welfare increase comparing to the
benchmark case without CSR activities. We ﬁnd that the regulator will set higher standards
of CSR eﬀort with respect to ﬁrms’ participation constraint to CSR comparing to the proﬁt-
maximizing certiﬁer. This leads to higher consumers surplus and total welfare comparing to
all alternative conﬁgurations.
An interesting extension of the present model could be the examination of how an additional
17policy instrument, like persuasive advertising, can be used by the regulator in order complement
the provision if CSR by private ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, following Petrakis et al.(2005), the
assumption that information provision is conducted via persuasive advertising, which will
increase the fraction of socially conscious consumers in the market can be formalized in the
present model as an increase in ¯ θ.20 From eq.(6) and (23) it is easy to check that an increase in
¯ θ enhances the increase in demand for the ﬁnal good of the ﬁrms that engage in CSR. Hence,
ﬁrms’ beneﬁt from CSR increases. This could lead to the increase of CSR eﬀort undertaken by
ﬁrms, which would amplify consumers’ surplus and total welfare, as well. In the present model,
for this beneﬁtt ob ee ﬀective, information provision should be combined with certiﬁcation,
or else a "market of lemons problem" will be in eﬀect. However, investing in persuasive
advertising imposes an additional cost which decreases total welfare. Thus, the ﬁnal outcome
from information provision via persuasive advertising depends on the relative weigh of each
eﬀect on total welfare.
The analysis was carried out for a duopolistic market structure. We believe that the
duopolistic market provides all essential insights about the ﬁrms’ owners’ incentives to under-
take CSR activities. We are also aware of the limitations of our analysis in assuming speciﬁc
functional forms. However, it is the nature of the equilibrium conditions that drive our re-
sults that allows us to argue that these results will also hold under general demand and cost
functions. The use of more general forms would jeopardize the clarity of our ﬁndings, without
signiﬁcantly changing their qualitative character. Given the current debate about the market
and welfare implications of Corporate Social Responsibility the present paper sheds light on
the policy instruments that a regulator may impose, in order to enhance ﬁrms’ incentives to
engage in CSR activities in oligopolistic markets.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
By comparing output, consumers’ surplus and total welfare under the Private Certiﬁcation
scenario (qpc, CS
pc
net,a n dTWpc) to the one obtained in the Benchmark case (qC, CSC and
TWC) we observe that:
20For instance, Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (2008) examine how changes in ¯ θ may inﬂunce the competition
status in a market.




net − CSC =
96c(a−c)(1+γ)2+γ(22+7γ)+19
768c2(1+γ)(2+γ)2 > 0,
TWpc − TWC =
96c(a−c)(1+γ)(3+γ)+7γ(2+γ)+25
768c2(1+γ)(2+γ)2 > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
If the participation constraint CSR eﬀort is set by the regulator, then
sR
pc − spc =
q
1
4 +4 c(a − c) − 4c
p








24c(1+γ) > 0. Hence, sR =m i n [ sR∗
,s R
pc] >s pc,a l w a y s .
P r o o fo fR e m a r k1
From proposition 3, sR =m i n [ sR∗
,s R
pc] >s pc, always. Furthermore, from the analysis of
eq.(10), we observe that CSR eﬀort has two opposing eﬀects on owner i’s output decision. On
the one hand, positive CSR eﬀort augments the demand for the ﬁrms’ good and thus tends to
increase equilibrium output, through an outward shift of both ﬁrms’ reaction function. On the
other hand, it increases ﬁrms’ unit costs, tending to decrease equilibrium output via an inwards
shift of both ﬁrms’ reaction functions. For 0 <s<¯ θ/c the ﬁrst eﬀe c ti sd o m i n a n ta n dt h eC S R
eﬀort undertaken by ﬁrms shifts their reaction function outwards. This outwards shift increases
for 0 <s<
¯ θ
2c, attains a maximum for spc =
¯ θ
2c and decreases for
¯ θ
2c <s<¯ θ/c .I ti se a s yt o
check that sR
pc < ¯ θ/c, always. At s = ¯ θ/c the two opposing eﬀects neutralize each other, hence,
there is no shift on the ﬁrms reaction function. Thus, since ¯ θ/c > sR
pc ≥ spc =
¯ θ
2c > 0,then
qC <q R <q pc,h o l d s .
Note also that from eq.(21) ∂CS
∂s =
3(a−pR)+2sR
3(1+γ) ≥ 0 for ¯ θ/c ≥ sR





Regarding total welfare we have, from the proof of Proposition 3: ∂TW
∂s |s=spc= 1
24c(1+γ) > 0.
Hence, since sR =m i n [ sR∗
,s R
pc] >s pc, total welfare is lower under the private certiﬁcation
scenario.
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